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Abstract  
The field of behavioral finance has attempted to explain a litany of biases, heuristics, and 
inefficiencies present in financial markets since its creation in the 1980’s. This paper is 
structured as a comprehensive literature review of behavioral finance, and includes both the 
seminal works as well as more recent papers. The various subtopics of behavioral finance will 
also be analyzed, which include loss aversion, corporate finance, and momentum/contrarian 
investing. Finally, this paper will draw unique conclusions across behavioral finance and 
hypothesize about what topics within behavioral finance are likely to yield the most interesting 
research in the near future. 
Keywords: behavioral finance, sentiment shifts, pricing inefficiencies, biases, momentum 
investing, contrarian investing, loss aversion, corporate finance. 
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Introduction 
 The field and study of finance has long been based around the idea of “efficient markets.” 
This term may mean different things to different people, but the Efficient Markets Hypothesis 
(EMH), which classical finance theory is built upon, states that at any given moment in time the 
price of any and all assets and securities being traded is correct and reflects all available 
information. The EMH also includes the law of one price, which means that there is only ever 
one price for an asset at any moment in time. The idea of correct prices is a neat and clean way 
of thinking, but the real question that begs answering is whether or not the law of one price 
actually exists.  
First off, if truly efficient markets exist, how can there be “bubbles” in stock markets? 
Let alone the number and severity of bubbles that we have recently endured. In addition, how 
reasonable is it that all people are 100% rational decision makers as the EMH posits? Basic logic 
should throw this idea out the window as there should be absolutely no way that a casual 
investor, or even further yet a novice investor, will ever trade and invest at the same level of 
rationality as a professional trader for an investment bank. Traditional theory argues that “smart 
money” investors, or those with the highest level of knowledge about financial markets, will 
counteract any noise caused by those that are trading “irrationally” through arbitrage, however 
over the past few decades there has been a mounting amount of evidence against the idea of 
complete arbitrage.  
Beginning in the 1980’s, finance theorists first began to consider the idea that the laws of 
investing were not quite as clean as they had originally theorized. And, as computers have 
become more powerful it has become possible to analyze the mountains of data to prove these 
thoughts true. From the collective messiness in breakdowns of traditional finance theory a new 
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field within finance has sprung up. This new field has been named aptly named behavioral 
finance. 
In the following pages, this paper will synthesize the feats and discoveries of behavioral 
finance and its researchers into a comprehensive literature review. This review will begin with a 
review of the history of the field so as to give the reader a more complete context for the events 
that are unfolding in the news. Another significant portion of the literature review will comprise 
of seminal works in the field, several of which have been cited by articles numbering in the 
thousands. The third part of the literature review will include new articles published in the last 
few years to in the hopes of providing the reader an idea of where the research in behavioral 
finance is focused today. The second and third parts of the literature review will be presented 
with each other, and be structured according to the appropriate subset of behavioral finance. This 
comprehensive literature review will then be used to form an opinion about the current state of 
finance theory. This conclusion will shine light onto the future of behavioral finance, and discuss 
a prediction for the future direction of behavioral finance as a field of study.  
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Research Questions 
The research questions for this paper are as follows: 
• How did behavioral finance begin, and what path has it taken to get where it is 
today? 
• Where does the field of behavioral finance stand at the present time? 
• Where is the field of behavioral finance going in the future? And, what specific 
areas within behavioral finance are likely to produce the best and most intriguing 
research? 
• Are there any discoveries that can be formed across academic articles and 
subtopics within behavioral finance that have yet to be made in the field?  
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Literature Review 
                                                   History of the Field 
To fully understand behavioral finance as it is today, one must first learn how it came to 
be. Shiller (2003) helps readers take this first step as the author offers a great overview of the 
behavioral finance’s evolution through the decades. In the 1980’s, the consistency of the efficient 
markets model was starting to be challenged. One issue that troubled the efficient markets 
complete acceptance was the problem of excess volatility. Several theories were formed to 
describe the wide swings in stock prices, however it proved challenging to reconcile the idea that 
a stock price was the present value of all future dividends (as most finance theorists would argue) 
with the volatility observed in stock prices. This meant that finance was either completely wrong 
about what made up the value for a stock, or investors were not fully rational. Following this 
revelation, Shiller pushed the idea that markets might be efficient on the micro level, but wildly 
inefficient on the macro level. In summary, this means that individual stock movements make 
more sense than the movement of the entire market. In the 1990’s, the amount of evidence 
contrary to efficient markets had become so much that behavioral finance started to gain traction 
as a legitimate field.  
Shiller then goes on to list several concepts that behavioral finance attempts to explain. 
The first of which are feedback models. Feedback models attempt to show that when investors 
trade they actually often trade based off of other investors rather than off new information. This 
can lead to inefficiencies and bubbles that traditional theory cannot explain. Another of Shiller’s 
main concepts is the differentiation of smart money and ordinary investors. In the Efficient 
Markets Hypothesis (EMH), it is assumed that smart money can fully offset any noise caused by 
sub-optimal decision making, however according to Shiller this is not the case in application. In 
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the conclusion of his piece, Shiller stresses that the field at the time of his writing (2003) was far 
from fully researched, but that there is more than enough evidence to validate its existence and 
justify future research.  
 Complementing to Shiller’s piece Heukelom (2014) provides a comprehensive account of 
how behavioral economics and finance were founded on the personal level. Behavioral 
economics (which by many definitions includes behavioral finance) began largely as the result of 
prospect theory as developed by Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky. Interestingly, Kahneman 
and Tversky were both psychologists with no or little training in classical finance. Prospect 
Theory proved useful to economics however, because it attempts to model the way people 
actually make decisions as opposed to simply relying on the utility decision-making strategies 
that made up finance theory . As Heukelom goes on to write, prospect theory argues that people 
make decisions based on the potential value of gains and losses rather than the utility of the 
decision. Richard Thaler, who was already a finance theorist at the time added the economic and 
finance theory necessary to apply prospect theory to financial markets. All three of these men, 
Amos Tversky, Daniel Kahneman, and Richard Thaler, are today considered to be among the 
founding fathers of behavioral finance.  
After the creation of several foundations and think-tanks, behavioral psychologists and 
finance theorists began to join forces to research anomalies in financial markets as Tversky, 
Kahneman, and Thaler were doing, and the result of this research was the creation of the field of 
behavioral finance. Today, behavioral finance researchers are questioning even the most basic of 
finance laws as researchers attempt to find out how investor biases and the limits of arbitrage 
affect the efficiency of capital markets.  
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Pricing Inefficiencies 
At its core, behavioral finance is about identifying and explaining inefficiencies and 
mispricing in financial markets. No article shows this better than the seminal work of Lamont 
and Thaler (2003). In their paper, the authors explore equity carve-outs of tech sector companies 
and their inherent mispricing following the Initial Public Offering (IPO) of the newly formed 
firm. The biggest example of this was Palm’s carve-out of 3Comm. In the carve-out, 3Comm 
issued an IPO of a small stake in Palm and promised to distribute the remaining stake to 3Comm 
shareholders at a future date. Given the small supply of shares, it is easy to see how a share of 
Palm might be highly coveted. In fact, the price of Palm went up so high that it was actually 
priced higher than 3Comm after the closing bell on the first day. The authors do point out that 
there was very little ability to short Palm’s stock early on, however, this does not explain why 
Palm’s share price exceeded 3Comm. The pricing of the stocks effectively meant that investors 
valued 3Comm’s non-Palm assets at less than $0. Even more surprising, the mispricing 
continued for much of the time that passed until the ultimate distribution of shares to 3Comm 
shareholders. The authors also identified several other carve-outs that resulted in so called 
“negative stubs,” or the parent company being valued at less than $0. 
 One of the core ideas surrounding the equity carve-outs is that the textbook definition and 
application of arbitrage simply does not hold in the real world. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) 
discuss this topic in their seminal work “The limits of arbitrage.” In it, the authors point out that 
limited capital, agency problems, and other constraints hinder the ability of arbitrageurs to 
correct inefficient prices. One of the biggest limits of arbitrage derives from situations when the 
arbitrageur is managing other people’s money. This causes the arbitrageur to not take as highly 
leveraged positions, because he could be forced to close out his positions at a loss if investors 
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want their money back. Further, most arbitrage occurs in foreign exchange, bond, and futures 
markets where there is a set payoff at sometime in the future. In other markets the uncertainty 
makes arbitrage much more difficult. Shleifer and Vishny’s work must absolutely be regarded as 
seminal as 3,390 subsequent works have cited the content.  
Chen and Lai (2013) focus not on arbitrage and inherent mispricings, but rather on how 
the framing of a company can impact expected returns. The authors focus on the effects that a 
reclassification can have on a company. In their paper, the authors look at 352 Taiwanese 
companies that had their Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code changed as the result of a 
government initiative or because the nature of their business changed. Theoretically, this 
reclassification should have had absolutely zero impact on the stock prices as nothing in the 
underlying companies had changed. However, the framing changes caused significant price 
changes both 10, 20, and 30 days after the new classification system was implemented. Also of 
note is that the returns included both negative and positive results.  
Similar to a Standard Industrial Classification number, a stock’s ticker symbol also deals 
with the framing of a company and its stock. As one can see from perusing any list of stocks and 
their symbols, some companies have symbols that make complete sense and almost form the 
company’s name, while others have less descriptive ticker symbols.  Peterurgsky (2014) 
researched stock ticker symbols in an attempt to determine whether or not the fluency (ability to 
make a word or sound) from the letters in a stock ticker impacted the attractiveness of the 
corresponding stock as an investment. After conducting a survey of college students, the author 
was able to conclude that there was no discernable difference between the attractiveness of 
stocks with fluent names versus those with influent names. What this means is that companies 
should not lose sleep over an influent stock ticker. That said, there is still evidence, notably Head 
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et. al. (2009), that suggests companies with clever tickers actually preform better than those that 
do not. Some of these clever tickers include a veterinary services company with the symbol 
WOOF and a casino companies with the symbols ODDS and SLOT. Perhaps as Peterurgsky 
argues in her article the excess returns of stocks with clever nicknames is because it shows a 
more clever and competent management team, but regardless stock ticker symbols seem to play 
at least some role in the framing and subsequent returns of a company.  
Given the totality of the evidence against EMH and the traditional finance paradigm, it is 
hard to argue against the developments in behavioral finance. This is the crux of Olsen (2008) as 
Olsen discusses how cognitive dissonance is the biggest problem between behavioral finance and 
traditional financial theory. Cognitive dissonance is the resistance of holding two ideas that are 
in conflict with one another, and accurately describes the problem of ascribing to traditional 
finance theory while also believing in the proven facts of behavioral finance. Because of its 
longevity and the fear that finance will regress to not being sound scientifically if behaviorists 
have their way, traditionalists cringe at much of what behavioral finance has argued about 
market inefficiencies. However, the fact of the matter is that work in many fields has shown that 
many of the principles of traditional finance theory are not nearly as concrete, as many would 
like them to be. Olsen argues that several broad themes of traditional finance create the most 
cognitive dissonance. Among these is the idea that “the human mind is a problem solving device 
like a computer,” and that “emotions have a negative influence on decision making because 
emotion is the antithesis of rationality.” Overall however, what Olsen concludes is that the 
amount of dissonance created from these two separate but competing worlds of finance must be 
solved in one way or the other. He also argues that the best chance for a resolution will likely 
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come with the help of scientific peer review and those just starting their careers as they have not 
yet been marred by what “always has been” with regards to traditional theory.   
Soufian, Forbes, and Hudson (2014) attempt to shine light onto an alternative to the 
Efficient Markets Hypothesis because of the latter’s reliance on completely rational investors 
among other things. This alternative is the Adaptive Markets Hypothesis, or AMH, which has 
been gaining steam since its creation in 2004. One of the benefits of the AMH is its ability to 
describe complex trading environments. Specifically, AMH is able to explain loss aversion, 
overreaction, and behavioral biases. This is because it centers on trading strategies that can come 
or go instead of purely rational investors making optimal capital allocations. AMH also views 
finance theory as an “engine rather than a camera.” This means that instead of providing a single 
look at how the economy functions, finance theory and its application instead drives much of the 
economy and a change in financial theory can change the actual economy. The practical result of 
this is that trading strategies based on finance theory can end up with horrible outcomes, but 
because the environment is ever changing it is impossible to test a strategy in the world it will 
ultimately be applied. The authors present an excellent example of this in the meltdown of the 
entire financial system in 2008 lead by the default of sub-prime housing loans. However, as the 
hypothesis would predict, in the years following 2008 the markets appear to have learned from 
their mistakes and adapted in wake of the failure.  
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Biases 
In the end, the reason behavioral finance exists is because not every person can possibly 
have and invest upon the same amount of information. Every person will read and observe 
different things, and every person will view the things they see differently. This is the crux of a 
series of works done on behavioral biases in investing. This issue is approached directly in 
Rieger (2012). In his work, Rieger looks at the complex framework of structured financial 
products and how investors view them. He concludes that several behavioral biases lead 
investors to make bad estimates on the probability of various outcomes tied to the payoff of the 
structured financial products, but that there may be ways to frame information on the products so 
as to not mislead investors.  
Taking the idea of biases one step further, Sahi, Arora, and Dhameja (2013) attempted to 
list the missteps investors tend to make in their piece “An Exploratory Inquiry into the 
Psychological Biases in Financial Investment Behavior.” The authors came up with a host of 
different biases. These include the tendency to:  
• Prefer known risks over unknown risks 
• Rely on a point of reference  
• Make investment decisions based on easily available information,  
• Play it safe with regards to risk,  
• Invest differently based on income source,  
• Invest with a view of social responsibility,  
• Invest in instruments which are familiar,  
• Feel that past decisions could have been better or were inevitable,  
• Be averse to losses,  
• Feel regret,  
• Be confident in one’s own ability,  
• Rely on family and friends,  
• Follow trends. 
 
 The article is important because it provides a comprehensive list of biases observed from 
the interviewing of a diverse group of people that had significant experience in investing.  
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If behavioral biases as shown above are as prevalent as they seem to be in developed 
markets, an interesting question is how do emerging markets fit into the fold? Speidell (2009) 
addresses this question as the author attempts to describe the limits of investing in emerging 
markets and how best to combat them. As it turns out, many of the same biases that are present 
in the developed world are present in emerging markets and then some. As the result of the 
familiarity bias that many investors have (seeking out things that are comfortable) most are 
hesitant to invest outside of their home country. Even those that are willing to take the leap often 
fall into what the author terms the “tyranny of the media” and are easily susceptible to thinking 
that the way the media might portray a certain part of the world is indicative of that entire region 
as a whole. In fact, as the article states some funds limit their emerging markets exposure to 
countries that fit the mold of “stability”, but what this type of strategy fails to recognize is that 
instability is a large driver of the profits available to be had by investors. This is because it is the 
fixing of this instability that leads to real change for a country and for investors, returns. If there 
was no more instability or uncertainty in emerging market, then there would be no reason to 
reward investors at a higher rate than in developed markets.  
This article not only chronicles the problems foreign investors face, but also of local 
investors. According to Speidell, while foreign investors are present in certain countries, local 
investors account for the lion share of trading in many emerging markets such as Bangladesh and 
Kenya. In these countries, investors are extremely prone to feedback trading, or trading based off 
the trades of others. Another curiosity is that locals often much prefer to buy low- priced stocks 
because they get a better “bang for their buck” even though in reality the value of the stock is 
much better reflected in something like the P/E ratio. Along the same lines, locals appear to be 
enamored with stock dividends even though they actually do not increase the portion of the 
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company that an investor owns. Speidell finally states that if investors can navigate in between 
the pitfalls of foreign and local investors alike while understanding the uncertainty that is in 
place, there are significant profits to be made.  
In the larger picture of behavioral finance, what Spiedell’s article shows is that markets 
undergo a transformational life cycle. Emerging markets as their name suggests are just 
beginning and have not necessarily shown high returns in the past. Along with this, these 
markets are riddled with inefficiencies and biases and massive bid-ask spreads. On the other 
hand, the modern markets of the developed world still have biases and inefficiencies but on a 
smaller level compared to many other countries. What this disparity shows is that there must be a 
growth in the markets of a country in order to reach true efficiency and clearly no markets have 
reached that point yet. However, with the development of high frequency trading, markets are 
pushing closer and closer to that line, and investors looking to profit on behavior will be forced 
to work harder to find bias and inefficiencies as markets become more developed.  
 
Momentum Investing 
 One of the phenomena that behavioral finance has uncovered is the presence of 
momentum in stock markets. Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (1998) created a theory to 
explain momentum through market over and under reactions based on many of the psychological 
biases identified by various academic works. The theory the authors provide to describe these 
biases is one based on investor overconfidence and biased self-attribution. Overconfident 
investors in the model overweight the information they receive and cause stock prices to move 
far from its fundamental value. As time goes on, more information comes out and the stock will 
move closer to its fundamental value. However, with the addition of biased self-attribution the 
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results are not that simple. Self-attribution is tendency for investors to too strongly attribute 
things aligned with their thinking to their own skill, while attributing things not aligned with 
their thinking to mere chance. With the addition of self-attribution, public information can cause 
even more overreaction from a previous private signal. In conclusion, the authors determined 
that their two-factor model was able to accurately describe patterns that have been discovered 
empirically in stock market research. This research is seminal to the field and is some of the first 
work done to create a theory on why there are under and overreactions in the stock market.  
Jegadeesh and Titman (2001) serves as an update to their seminal 1993 paper. In their 
1993 work they created an investment strategy based on the idea that stocks exhibit momentum 
in the market to see whether one could make profits based off of momentum. In their 2001 
update, the authors first preformed an out-of-sample test on the 8 years following the publication 
of their original paper and found that their momentum strategy (buy stocks that had good results 
over the last 3 to 12 months and sell stocks with bad performance over the same period) yielded 
similar results to what it did in the original set of years. This out-of-sample test further validated 
the 1993 results. Also, the authors looked at portfolio performance 13 to 60 months after 
portfolio formation and found that returns were negative, which showed that momentum has a 
finite shelf life. The identification of these negative returns gave rise to the idea of contrarian 
investing.  
George and Hwang (2004) took momentum investing a step further by choosing to form 
momentum portfolios based off of 52-week highs rather than solely recent performance. By 
buying stocks close to but just below their 52-week high, and shorting stocks that were close but 
just above their 52-week low the authors found extremely positive results. The returns of this 
strategy were far larger than the returns that came from using the past trading strategies such as 
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the one used in Jegadeesh and Titman (2001). In theory, this strategy is successful because 
traders hesitate to push prices above or below these benchmarks even though the information on 
the company warrants it. However, eventually the market overpowers the resistance and pushes 
the prices past the threshold. 
 
Contrarian and Value Investing 
 Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1994) researched the opposite side of the spectrum in 
their paper on contrarian investing. The idea of “value investing” or buying beaten down stocks 
and betting on them to rebound is certainly not a new idea. However, the cause for the success of 
this strategy has long been debated. In their paper, the authors find that for nearly every time 
period a contrarian portfolio with a time horizon of over one year is hugely profitable. Because 
the results were so dramatic the authors were able to largely breakdown the idea that value stocks 
are inherently more risky, but rather linear extrapolation of past results leads to momentum 
stocks going too high and value stock prices going too low.  
Magnuson (2011) also tackles the question of whether the high returns of value firms are 
a factor of increased riskiness or of something else. Magnuson’s research centered on what 
happened to stocks after they suffered a bad earnings announcement. The author found that when 
glamour stocks (stocks with large growth rates) suffered an earnings miss their stock price 
predictably went down. However, when value stocks suffered the same scale of miss, the stocks 
on average went up. Moreover, the author found that if a value company’s fundamentals 
weakened (their riskiness went up) the stock still went up on average. The most logical 
explanation for this is that the market had already priced in the bad results and had actually 
overreacted on how bad the result might be. Also, because glamour stocks usually trade on large 
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P/E ratios, a large portion of their price is derived from future growth rates. So, if the company 
revises down growth targets or misses their current quarter or annual target then the company’s 
stock will be hit quite hard.  
The debate on the riskiness of growth stocks continues to this day and will be visited 
again later in this paper, but the preceding three articles paint a much different picture of value 
stocks than traditional finance theory does. At the least, it is clear that investing in glamour 
stocks is actually inherently risky. This is because while glamour stocks may have solid growth 
and fundamentals, their valuations are built on aggressive growth targets that can send their stock 
tanking if missed.  
 Combining multiple elements of time trending prices into one, Hong and Stein (1999) 
attempted to come up with a model that could unify under and overreactions as well as short-
term momentum and long-term reversals. The model the authors created is built upon the idea 
that there are two types of investors, news watchers and momentum traders. The distinction 
between the two is that news watchers only reacted to privately held slowly diffusing 
information on stock fundamentals, and momentum traders could only trade on movements in 
short-term stock prices. The result was a model that created an under reaction from news 
watchers followed by a round of arbitrage from the momentum traders that brought the price to 
its fundamental level (intrinsic value without speculation). However, the model departs from 
pure market efficiency after that, because the first round of momentum traders initiate a second 
round and so on and so forth until the price has significantly deviated from its underlying value 
leading to an inevitable price shock that brings the value of the stock back down. Next, the 
authors added more complexity to their model and determined that even when adding smart 
money and contrarian investors their results still held. The authors finally made several 
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predictions about what one should find in analyzing stock returns based on their model, and 
hypothesized that momentum strategies should be the most profitable for the longest time in the 
smallest and most thinly covered stocks. They also suggested that public information should 
generate different stock price movements than private information because it is available to the 
mass public quicker. Researchers have subsequently confirmed both of these assertions in peer-
reviewed works. 
 
Analysts: Smart Money or Just as Dumb as Everybody Else? 
 Also on the topic of momentum, De Bondt and Thaler (1990) ask the question of whether 
or not security analysts also contribute to overreaction in the stock market. Most finance theorists 
would hold that securities analysts are part of a group of so called “smart money” and should 
reign in overzealous investors by maintaining fully rational price targets. However, De Bondt 
and Thaler find that the same pattern of overreaction found in naïve undergraduates is present in 
the forecasts of trained security analysts. This conclusion casts further doubt onto the idea that 
smart money will arbitrage noise away from the stock market. 
 Going further, Corredor, Ferrer, and Santamaria (2013) examine analysts to see if they 
really are in fact “smart” at all. The first thing the authors note is that analysts are historically 
very optimistic. This means that they offer many more positive ratings than negative ones. In 
order to find out whether analysts are in fact smart, the researchers attempt to find out if this 
optimism was simply the result of modeling investor sentiment or something else. To run their 
analysis, the authors gathered returns from a database in several countries from 1994 through 
2007 and attempted to see how analyst recommendations matched up with the investor sentiment 
of that period. After running their analysis, the authors concluded that there is significant 
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correlation between analyst recommendations and investor sentiment. Furthermore, the authors 
also concluded that the impact was more pronounced in stocks with low volatility, low B/M, and 
high dividend yield. What this means is that securities analysts do not appear to attempt to 
balance out the market. Instead, they move along with the markets encouraging optimistic 
investors to continue to bid up stocks. Going further into this thought, Jones and Johnstone 
(2012) found that upon analyzing analyst recommendations of companies just before declaring 
bankruptcy that two-thirds of analysts had a buy or hold rating on the stock at the time of failure. 
Also, the disparity was more pronounced in America where 73% of analysts rated the stock as a 
buy or hold. This goes to further prove the presence of optimism and overreaction by analysts.  
 Another problem with securities analysts are that they sometimes have more skin in the 
game than one might think. Mola (2013) looks at the initiation of analyst coverage on IPOs and 
noticed several interesting things. First, Mola finds that often analysts will downgrade a 
“seasoned” stock just prior to beginning to cover an IPO. This is significant given the relatively 
small amount of downgrades analysts tend to issue. The second, and more troubling finding is 
that from 1997 to 2001 before rules were adopted to prevent the process analysts were likely to 
“downgrade a seasoned stock prior to promoting a cold IPO underwritten by their investment 
bank.” This finding is obviously troubling even if the problem has been stopped, because it 
shows that analysts are not out to be “smart money” but rather to do their job, which on occasion 
may be to go against what their true judgment as an analyst might be.  
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Loss Aversion and Diversification Heuristics 
Benartzi and Thaler (1995) address causes for a historically high equity risk premium. 
The authors analyzed possible causes of an inflated risk premium and were able to come up with 
a combination of factors to explain it. The authors concluded that a reasonable explanation for 
the high equity risk premium was a combination of loss aversion and short evaluation periods. 
Loss aversion is the tendency to react more strongly to losses than gains, and the authors set that 
level at 2.5:1. This means investors feel equally negative about a $1.00 loss as they feel 
positively about a $2.50 gain, or put another way feel 2.5X as bad about a $1 loss as they feel 
good about a $1 gain. Although EMH would argue that people weight gains and losses equally, 
the reality of the matter is that people hate to lose money. Also, the authors determined that for 
the math to work investors would have to have evaluation periods of 1 year, which goes right 
along the lines of logic as 1 year is a reasonable time to rethink investing decisions and meet 
with one’s financial advisor.  
 Interestingly, Benzion, Krupalnik, Shavit (2013) added to Benartzi and Thaler’s piece to 
show that the addition of a high-risk stock fund option to the original experiment reduced the 
effect of myopic loss aversion because of the subject’s tendencies to diversify equally to all 
investment options.  
The first article to identify the type of diversification mentioned above was Benartzi and 
Thaler (2001). In the article, the authors gave out questionnaires to see how people with 
knowledge of investing were likely to invest their money. Benartzi and Thaler found that 
investors have a tendency to invest an equal portion of their savings into all options provided by 
their employer or plan provider. They termed this extreme form of diversification the “1/n 
heuristic,” and while not bad in and of its self, it leaves investors extremely susceptible to having 
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riskier or safer portfolios than intended based solely on the composition of funds that a company 
offers.  
Adding to the work of Benartzi and Thaler, Mauck and Salzsieder (2015) attempt to 
answer the question of why high cost index funds exist. An index fund attempts to mimic a 
financial index such as the S&P 500. Interestingly, there are many funds that attempt to do this, 
but many have widely different fees (some upwards of 5% and some near 0%). If all of the funds 
do what they are designed for (which many do), then the expected payouts of all of the funds 
should be the same. As a result, the only rational motivation for investors should be to find the 
cheapest fees and invest their money in that fund. However, the researchers were able to 
conclude that as the result of a diversification bias investors are still driven to put portions of 
their money in funds that they know have higher fees, the same expected payouts, and the same 
historical success as a different fund. As Mauck and Salzieder point out, this is a clear violation 
in the Law of One Price.  
Continuing with the idea of framing in investment accounts, Anagol and Gamble (2013) 
investigated the effect that the presentation of results has on equity allocation. For their 
experiment, the authors presented subjects with data about how investments had preformed in the 
past and then asked them to choose an allocation going forward. The only difference between the 
two test groups was that one group’s read out was asset by asset and the other group’s read out 
only listed the return of four portfolios of similar assets. The authors found that even though the 
“asset” subjects could have easily calculated the data that the “portfolio” subjects were given, the 
subjects given the returns of each asset had equity allocation nearly 10% lower than those who 
only saw the portfolio charts. This is interesting for several reasons and one of which is because 
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it directly challenges the idea of full rationality like many of the other articles in this paper. Also, 
these results back up several aspects of models derived from prospect theory.  
Like past performance or total fees, dividend yield can be extremely important for some 
investors in their selection of mutual funds. Unfortunately, some mutual funds attempt to 
artificially inflate yields through “juicing” as Harris et. al. (2014) shows. Juicing as described by 
the author is the buying and selling of stocks close to their ex-dividend date to artificially inflate 
the dividend yield that a fund advertises. Equally as unfortunate as the fact that mutual funds 
engage in juicing, is that as a result of juicing funds are rewarded with greater capital inflows 
from investors even though they are hurting investors with increased transactions costs and lower 
overall returns. Also, stocks have been shown to have negative returns just after their ex-
dividend date, so any theory of increased returns through increased dividends does not hold 
water. Also, even if this strategy breaks even, there is a disadvantage tax wise to paying out 
dividends to investors instead of returning capital from gains. In conclusion, because investors 
contain a biased predisposition to want high dividend yields in funds, some mutual funds have 
created a juicing strategy that increases trading costs, taxes, and decreases returns. However, as 
long as the “fake” high yielding funds are rewarded with increasing amounts of capital the 
problem is surely to persist.  
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Predicting Future Prices  
One concept behavioral finance has been particularly successful to explain is bubbles in 
stock markets. Shiller (1998) used the foundations of behavioral finance to predict a large 
collapse in stock prices that became known as the tech bubble. Shiller wrote a follow-up piece 
along the same lines in 2001 and accurately predicted the impending doom and collapse of the 
stock market. Shiller’s use of Dividend/Price and PE ratios took a significant chink out of the 
armor of the Efficient Markets Hypothesis, because EMH argues that valuation ratios cannot 
predict future changes in prices.  
While he did not predict one of the largest stock market collapses in modern times, 
Vasiliou et al. (2008) looks at how behavioral finance can be used to predict future prices. In 
their paper, the authors analyze the returns on the Athens Stock Exchange in Greece from 1995-
2005 of large cap stocks to see whether a combination of technical analysis and behavioral 
finance can create profitable trading strategies. As is mentioned elsewhere, EMH argues that all 
information available at any given moment in time is completely priced into the stock at the 
moment it becomes available, and as a result no profit can be made through analyzing trends, or 
anything of the sort. On the other hand, the strategy of technical analysis argues that one can 
make profits because the stock market moves in trends and will behave in the future as it has in 
the past. This kind of strategy lends itself quite nicely to behavioral finance theory around 
feedback theory and momentum observations.  In their paper, the authors employed the use of 
short and long-term moving averages to predict the future prices of stocks. The authors then 
either bought or sold the stock depending on whether the model suggested it was a buy or a sell. 
The authors concluded that under the examined trading rules the strategy was “highly profitable” 
and as a result confirmed the presence of behavioral phenomenon in the Athens Stock Exchange. 
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 Interestingly, just as the rise of technology has brought behavioral finance to the 
forefront, it also stands as its greatest opponent. Automated trading has been expanding 
exponentially over the past several years as engineering has caught up with finance. Large 
institutions are running entire funds that trade on automated algorithms. This is the topic of 
Kumiega and Vliet (2012) as they attempt to initiate academic research into this new tool in 
finance. In the article, Kumiega and Vliet discuss automated trading and the behavioral aspects 
surrounding it. Obviously, there is very little sub-optimal behavior in a machine if the 
programming is done well, but there is behavioral component in the actual management of the 
program to design the machine itself. In general, it has been shown that managers are more apt to 
throw money at a project rather than shut it down even if it’s a financially poor decision. Also, 
the authors postulate that that this may be pushed even further because of the financial incentives 
surrounding automated trading development. Despite the high startup costs of an automated 
trading system, the authors conclude that given its rise in popularity, there must also be a 
sufficient behavioral component in the stock market to justify its existence. Interestingly, if true 
this argument about the usefulness of automated trading both confirms the validity of much of 
the work in behavioral finance and simultaneously threatens to end it by fully exploiting or 
“arbitraging” the behavioral component of the stock market away. However, it is likely that with 
the vast amount of people and interactions in the stock market that the days of behavioral 
inefficiencies in the stock market are still large and many.   
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Application In the Real World 
Much of finance theory is created in laboratories of sorts where authors control the 
rationality of investors and their choices through complex mathematical equations. However, the 
true test of a financial theory is how it can be applied in the real world. Kahneman and Riepe 
(1998) detailed several biases and general characteristics that investors may possess. The authors 
also describe what they believe to be the best way to work around them as a financial planning 
professional.  These biases and characteristics include:  
• Overconfidence  
• Over-optimism  
• Hindsight bias  
• Overreaction to chance events 
• The use of a purchase point as a benchmark  
• Short and long views  
• The ability or lack thereof to live with the consequences of decisions 
• Regrets of both omission and commission.   
 
Like Kahneman and Riepe, Doviak (2015) approached behavioral finance from the point 
of view of a financial planner. In her paper, Doviak attempts to hone in on the advisor side and 
provide readers with strategies for applying behavioral finance to one’s practice. Doviak stresses 
that while incorporating behavioral strategies is not for everyone, analyzing a clients tendencies 
and discussing the reasons behind their biases as well as ways to get around them can lead to 
increased success in the planning field. The fact that a financial planner is writing about applying 
behavioral finance to a practice shows that behavioral finance has truly reached the level at 
which it is applicable to everyday professionals, which is a big step for any theory. Also, 
differently than Kahneman and Riepe, Doviak is sensitive to the fact that the application of these 
strategies is not for everyone.  
Similar to Doviak’s work, Bucciol and Zarri (2015) analyzed large amounts of data on 
the personalities and subsequent allocation of investment dollars of individuals to find out if 
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there is any discernible connection between personality and the way someone invests their 
money. Interestingly, the authors found that those who scored low on tests for agreeableness or 
high for cynical hostility were significantly more likely to take greater risks with their 
investments. This is a significant advance in the understanding of investors, because before this 
work finance theory has assumed that investors decide on where to put their money in roughly 
the same way. However, what this article shows is that the way one sees their life and the world 
can actually have a sizable impact on their investments. As these ideas become more researched, 
professionals will be able to incorporate them into their work and help investors make more 
optimal decisions despite their predispositions to act otherwise.  
Aside from financial planning and advising, the largest application of behavioral finance 
in investing is in investment decision-making and securities selection. Wright (2008) looks at 16 
self-proclaimed behavioral mutual funds to see whether applying behavioral finance to 
investment decision-making is profitable one, and if there is anything not yet discovered about 
its success. Also of note, one of the main funds discussed in the article is actually managed by 
Richard Thaler and Daniel Kahneman sits on the board of the company who runs it. These names 
should seem familiar, because they are both fathers of behavioral finance and authors to several 
papers quoted in this paper. Nonetheless, Wright found that the behavioral funds experienced an 
above average flow of dollars into the behavioral funds. Also, these funds generally beat S&P 
500 index funds on a raw basis, but their risk-adjusted returns were more or less the same. The 
author also concluded that this increased risk comes from the so called “value factor”. Because 
their excess return came from the value factor, the author argues that behavioral funds at their 
core are simply value funds with better marketing. This marketing is why they attract higher 
inflows of capital not because they are actually better funds.   
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The reasoning behind this argument is mostly sound, and it would be remiss to suggest 
that a behavioral fund is remarkably different than a simple value fund, but there is one 
difference. In a value fund, the manager is using any different number of tools to come up with 
what they believe is a “cheap” asset. In a behavioral fund, the manager should be locked on to 
the under and overreactions of the market specifically. The difference is small, but it is a 
difference nonetheless. Also, regarding the “value factor” as is discussed in other places in this 
paper finance theory argues that it is a multiplier of returns because it shows inherent risk in the 
asset Fama and French (1992). However, many in behavioral finance reject this underlying 
assumption. If one throws out the value factor as an increase in risk, then behavioral funds that 
have outperformed the S&P 500 on a raw basis also outperform on a risk-adjusted basis, and as a 
result should look much more attractive to investors.  
Asness et al. (2015) also looks at value investing. However, instead of looking at whether 
value returns are a compensation for risk, Asness and his co-authors instead address the best 
ways to successfully avoid what they see as several misconceptions surrounding the topic. First, 
the authors define what the essence of value investing really is to them. At its core, the authors 
define value investing as buying “cheap” assets and shorting “expensive” ones. From this 
definition value investing can go several different ways. One of the misconceptions about value 
investing that the authors try to dispel is that in order to be profitable in a portfolio that someone 
has to be a great stock picker like Warren Buffet. And while Warren Buffet has been extremely 
successful using a value investing approach on a very few number of undiversified investments, 
however all the academic research done on the matter suggests that by using a diversified 
portfolio investors can still make significant profits. Another main point in the article was that 
value strategies are even more effective when implemented with quality measures such as 
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profitability, and the strategies can also be used to generate returns by benchmarking some 
measure of value for different asset classes such as currencies, commodities, and bonds. The 
authors also mention as has been touched on earlier in this work that it has yet to be proven 
whether value stocks provide excess returns because of a higher risk than other stocks, or 
because of a behavioral abnormality. Nevertheless, this article shows there is money to be made 
if value investing is done the right way.  
Given the totality of biases that are present in investors it is obvious that it is easy to 
make mistakes when investing. Because of this, Fromlet (2001) created a checklist of sorts for 
defensive behavioral finance, which he defines as doing just enough to ensure you do not make 
mistakes. The checklist Fromlet created is a list of questions and reminders for one to ask 
himself before acting on a decision. The checklist is as follows: 
• Check the source of your information. 
• Try to get exclusive information 
• Make sure to not make the wrong conclusions in fundamental analysis 
• Are your advisors overconfident? 
• Are you yourself overconfident? 
• Speak with your strategic opponents. 
• Compare positive ad negative views 
• Be careful of anchoring to an expectation 
• How old is the information or forecast? 
• How strong is the herd mentality? 
• Consider how important messages are being reported (positive/negative 
• Is this the latest news in line with my strategy? 
• Understand the numbers 
• Dare to question recommendations 
• See behavioral finance as a strategic tool 
• Does it look irrational? 
 
This kind of a checklist is valuable to an individual investor for multiple reasons. First, if 
an investor is considering an investment idea they came up with, then this checklist can serve as 
an initial screen for investors to make sure that they are looking at the idea from all angles. 
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Secondly, if an investor is considering an idea given to them by an advisor the investor still 
needs to be able to do their own due diligence and make sure that is a good strategy. This list 
gives investors in the second category the right questions to look into and to ask.  
 
Corporate Finance and Capital Budgeting 
One part of behavioral finance that is overlooked at times is its effect on corporate 
finance and capital budgeting. On this topic, Stein (1996) tackles the question of how finance 
managers should tackle capital budgeting in light of information brought to the forefront thanks 
to behavioral finance. Specifically, how should companies calculate required rates of return if a 
beta is not predictive of future results, and therefore the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) is 
rendered useless? Stein offers two ways for capital budgeting if CAPM is thrown out. The first is 
a model that attempts to project future stock returns. If this is the goal of the manager, then 
something closer to the Fama-French three factor model should be used. However, it can be 
argued the required returns calculated by the Fama-French model have relatively nothing to do 
with risk. So, if the goal is to accurately model the risk of the asset, one needs a model that will 
more accurately capture the real risk of the asset. Ironically, CAPM, or something like it may be 
one of the best options if this is one’s goal. This is because CAPM theoretically factors in the 
risk of the stock with a company’s beta. The trouble with only using this however is that normal 
CAPM betas are subject to considerable noise, and therefore may not be a great measure of 
fundamental risk. So, there is still room for discussion as to what the best model to use for 
capturing asset risk. Also, Stein concludes that a company’s choice on whether to use either 
approach should lie in whether the company is short term or long-term focused, and whether or 
not the company has financial constraints. If the company is short term focused it should use 
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models that most closely model future prices, but if it is long-term focused and does not have 
financial restraints use of the asset risk model is likely to be more advantageous.  
Also on the topic of corporate finance, Heaton (2002) looks at managerial optimism and 
how free cash flow can both help and hurt companies with overly optimistic managers. In the 
article, Heaton finds that managers who are overly optimistic over-estimate the NPV of 
company’s projects and also believe that a firm’s risky securities are undervalued. This premise 
has two results. The first is that the manager will tend to take projects that are actually Net 
Present Value (NPV) negative, because they are overly optimistic about the project’s true worth. 
In this sense free cash flow (FCF) is a bad thing because it makes it easier to accept bad projects. 
On the other hand, if a manager views a company’s securities as undervalued, then he will be 
less likely to want to issue new securities to fund NPV positive projects. This combination leads 
to significant loss for the company. In this sense, FCF is a good thing, because a manager will be 
able to accept NPV positive projects without issuing new securities.  
Another application of behavioral finance to corporations is through prospect theory. 
Prospect theory, as mentioned before in this paper was created in Tversky and Kahneman (1979) 
and departs from traditional theory because it argues that subjects evaluate the potential value of 
losses and gains rather than the utility of the final outcome. Also, subjects evaluate these values 
using certain mental strategies, or heuristics, which may not be fully rational. Kliger and Tsur 
(2011) take prospect theory a step further by applying it to troubled corporations. The authors 
looked at companies from the Compustat database, and attempted to find out if a company’s 
reference point of loss aversion on the prospect theory curve changed in correspondence with its 
business performance. The authors were able to conclude that the better a firm’s results were, the 
more loss averse the firm was likely to be. Also, the exact opposite was true for firms that had 
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recently suffered bad performance. Firms that had suffered bad performance were less loss 
averse and more willing to take risks. While it may seem like common sense that a struggling 
firm would take more risks to get back on top, a change in investing strategy based off recent 
performance is a meaningful departure from traditional finance theory. In the end, the authors 
were able to show that recent performance was a very large factor in future risk vs. return capital 
budgeting. 
 
Sentiment shifts 
 Traditional theory holds that investors will behave the same regardless of market 
conditions, however simply thinking about how scared some people still are to invest after the 
financial collapse in 2008 shows that this cannot possibly be the case. Livanas (2011) tackles this 
issue as he attempts to find out how far away from fully rational utility investors really are. 
Livanas studied 236 Australian pension investors to determine what their risk aversion and time 
horizons were. He also looked at how the changes recently made to their portfolios changed their 
assumed risk levels. The conclusion of the analysis was that as sentiment changed to the 
negative, risk aversion levels increased. Along with many of the other ideas discussed, this 
concept should make sense. As sentiment surrounding the market becomes negative, or investors 
are pessimistic about stock returns, it would make sense that investors would be more averse to 
taking on risk.  
The practical application of this is that if investors act as this model predicts the effects of 
a collapse will be essentially compounded by changes in investor sentiment and risk aversion. 
This is because as markets turn to the negative there are people that want to sell their securities 
or assets, however in order for investors to take on risk and buy the stock in question from the 
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seller they will demand a more discounted price than they previously would have. This causes 
the problem to compound and the result is a steep financial downturn and very discounted prices. 
In the larger picture, this type of argument fits nicely into the idea that the stock market moves in 
bear and bull cycles.  
 Another great view at how investors behave when pressured is presented in Hu and 
McInish (2013). In the article, the authors look at spam e-mails relating to stock 
recommendations in order see how investors react towards them. Specifically, the authors looked 
at a sample of 580 different spam e-mail campaigns for different stocks, and analyzed returns 
from before and after the emails were sent to see if they caused an abnormal spike in trading. It is 
also of note that the sample of spam e-mails for this study had previously been used in several 
other scholarly articles. Many of the stocks being spammed were “pink sheet stocks” meaning 
that they were penny stocks and not traded everyday. However, the researchers noted large 
increases in trade volume after the spam e-mails were sent. In addition, there were qualities of 
several of the e-mails that seemed to work better than others. The authors discovered that when 
the message from an “analyst” contained a price target there was much more likely to be a 
change in the price of the stock. This points to an uncertainty bias in investors. Also, Hu and 
McInish found that the e-mails that caused the biggest reaction on average called for the price of 
the stock to multiply by 53 times! This is a perfect example of an overweighting bias, or a 
person’s tendency to overweight a small likelihood of success even when there is a very low 
probability it will happen. In the end, the researchers were able to conclude that spam e-mails do 
in fact move the market. In addition, the authors also discovered that the more specific and 
outlandish the predictions in the e-mails were, the more the market moved.  
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 As shown above, sentiment is key to the way investors allocate their money. Wang, 
Keller, and Siegrist (2011) looked at the way someone’s knowledge about a financial product 
affects its assumed riskiness. After collecting surveys and running correlational analysis, the 
authors determined that investors attributed significantly less risk to investments they have 
knowledge of regardless of the underlying riskiness of the investment. Also, not only was there a 
correlation as a whole, but there were several micro trends as well. Included in these was the 
tendency to perceive domestic investments as safer than foreign ones. While this article at its 
core is about sentiment, its practical application is very similar to the work previously discussed 
on diversification. If investors consider investments they know as safe, then that might lead to 
very inefficient and potentially overly risky portfolios. A great example of this is an investor who 
invests the lion’s share of his investments in his company’s stock while thinking he is investing 
in a “safe” asset. While individual exposure to a stock can lead to riches, it can also lead to rags 
and it is most certainly never a safe investment. One only needs to ask investors in Enron to find 
a first hand example of this point.  
Usually in behavioral finance the only reference points used in the analyzing of a bias are 
the buying price and the selling price. In other words, when it comes down to it behavioral 
finance often doesn’t address how a stock got to where it’s priced. Grosshans and Zeisberg 
(2015) attack this exact idea by testing how investors react to different price paths of a security. 
The authors found that by far the path that left investors feeling the best was a path that first went 
down significantly and then came back up. This was compared to a price that went up then 
down, and a security that slowly only moved up. To ensure that all basis were covered, the price 
of all three paths started and ended at the same price ($60 and $65 respectively). Also, the 
authors performed the same test except where the stock as a whole dropped from $60 to $55. 
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Surprisingly, the data showed that investors felt almost as positive when the stock went from $60 
to $55 but went way down first before coming up as they did the stock that went way up before 
coming down and finishing at $65 even though there was a $10 difference between the two 
alternatives. This shows the power that the path that a price takes can have large impacts on the 
mentality of an investor. The authors also were able to confirm the presence of the disposition 
effect in their study. The disposition effect, or the tendency to hold losing stocks while selling 
winning stocks is present in this work as investors were shown to judge their investments that 
were above their purchase price at the current price level, but still value a stock that has gone 
down at the purchase price and as a result hang on to the losing stock.  
Taking a step away from the tightly controlled experiments usually performed in 
academic finance, Kranner et. al. (2015) chronicles the behavioral finance implications of a ten 
year study done on the portfolio management program (PMP) in Vienna, Austria in which 
students run funds and compete against each other as everyday portfolio managers would. The 
authors capitalized on this setting to test two behavioral theories of portfolio management. These 
two theories were the disposition effect, which was covered above, and the tournament effect. 
The tournament effect occurs when those leading a competition attempt to maintain their lead 
while those behind take escalating amounts of risk to catch up. The tournament effect was 
confirmed in the PMP as the incentive to beat one another lead laggards to take aggressive risks 
to catch up. However their was actually no disposition effect found in the study, and in fact the 
opposite was found. This means that the fund managers were more likely to sell losing stocks 
and hold on to winning stocks than vice versa. As the authors point out, much of this likely 
comes from the finite window of time for the funds (1 school year) and the fact that the only way 
capital can be raised for a new idea is by selling a current investment. While the study done on 
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the students in this setting should not be extrapolated to describe fund behavior in the 
marketplace, this article serves as an interesting microscope to examine possible behavioral 
patterns and how they might manifest themselves in actual portfolio managers nonetheless.  
 
Where Are We Headed 
 After covering what can be conservatively called a massive amount of information, it is 
still important to note that it is impossible to incorporate every aspect of a field especially a field 
like behavioral finance into one coherent paper without boring even the most respected reader to 
tears. However, just as important as covering as much about the current state and history of a 
field is projecting where it is going. With regards to this there are likely several different areas of 
behavioral finance that will shine in the coming years.  
The first area is wealth and investment management. As stated in the paper, investment 
advisors must take on behavioral finance on two fronts. Advisors must be able to both 
understand the behavioral phenomena present in prices as well as the behavioral biases and 
heuristics present in their clients. As a result, I believe that there is likely to be increased research 
done on individual investor biases until there is the creation of a somewhat standard test for 
investor biases. 
 Hirshleifer (2014) also discusses what he believes behavioral finance will focus on in the 
future and came up with a similar thought process. Hirshleifer argues that more research into the 
attitudes and motivation surrounding decision-making needs to be done. Specifically, this would 
include one’s choice to borrow vs. save, risk tolerance, and willingness to exploit other 
participants. Also, as this paper does, the author suggests that behavioral finance needs to move 
towards the analysis of particular biases and the grouping of biases for research. This is similar 
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to the point made above about the formulation of a test for biases. Finally, Hirshleifer argues that 
behavioral finance needs to shift into social finance. Hirshleifer defines social finance as 
studying how “social norms, moral attitudes, religions and ideologies affect financial behaviors.” 
Also important in social finance is, “how ideologies that affect financial decisions form and 
spread.” The idea of social finance is an intriguing one, and if researchers are successful in 
researching the way these social constructs affect investment decisions it will be a significant 
achievement.  
While financial advisors have much to look forward to in behavioral finance corporate 
finance will also benefit. This is because even though the CFO’s and managers in charge of 
capital budgeting are professionals, overconfidence is still very prevalent in businesses. Also, 
because of the high arbitrage costs for outside investors these problems are much more likely to 
go unaddressed. Particularly interesting research in the future may include the degree to which 
activist campaigns from hedge funds e.g. Starboard and Olive Garden help to correct the 
behavioral mistakes of managers. Also, future corporate finance research should focus on the 
creation of a replacement to or more accurate version of CAPM that still measures asset risk.  
Finally, there are two more areas that behavioral finance should look to in the future. 
First, researchers need to commit to and get behind a replacement for the Efficient Markets 
Hypothesis.  This may be the AMH as discussed in this paper or a related theory. If this is done, 
then behavioral finance will have a firm footing and a clear position on how it believes markets 
truly work. Secondly, it will be interesting to see if researchers can come up with a structure for a 
market life as mentioned in the previous review of Speidell (2009). What this means practically 
speaking is that research should be done to see if there is a consistent pattern of behavioral biases 
or mistakes that investors in emerging markets exhibit that gradually become less and less 
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prevalent as the market becomes more developed, or does each economy develop independently 
based on the population and its unique elements.  
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